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SUBJECT: **Haitian-American Relations 1957-1959**

I enclose a summary of Haitian-American Relations for the past two years prepared at my suggestion by Second Secretary of Embassy, Virgil P. Randolph, III, shortly prior to his departure on transfer.

While this report is not intended to be exhaustive, it is thought it might provide a convenient summary of the principal events during that period for reference by interested officers in the Department concerned with Haitian Affairs.

Mr. Randolph is to be commended for the careful preparation of a useful report.

Gerald A. Drew

Enclosure:
1. Memorandum.

Advance Copy:
Haitian Desk/CMA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
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HAITIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1957-1959

The following narrative recapitulation of the principal developments in Haitian-American relations during the period July 1957 - July 1959 is submitted to the Department in the hopes that such a summary might prove a useful guide in helping to bring this eventful period into its proper perspective.

On July 30, 1957, the United States Government formally recognized the Haitian Military Council of Government, a Junta of Army officers which had seized power on June 14, 1957, from the Provisional President Daniel FIGNOLE, who, in turn, had held power only for nineteen days. The Military Council of Government's accession to power on June 15 climaxed a series of transitory governments desperately struggling to control an increasingly chaotic domestic political situation created by the sudden ouster in mid-December 1956 of the long time (1950-1956) Haitian strongman and President, Paul E. MAGLOIRE.

Magloire's overthrow created a political vacuum which for some months proved increasingly difficult to fill and finally resulted in a virtual breakdown in the Haitian Government and near civil war. Magloire was followed by his constitutional successor, Chief Justice Joseph N. PIERRE-LOUIS, who lasted only until early February 1957. Pierre-Louis was followed as Provisional President by Franck SYLVAIN, whose Government fell on April 2, 1957. Sylvain was succeeded by an Executive Council of Government (Collège) representing the most important political figures (and rivals) in Haiti; however, the Executive Council proved unworkable. Despite the fact that it was recognized by us on May 7, 1957, it was not until May 15 that the Honorable Gerald A. Drew presented his letters of credence to it. The Council gave way to Daniel FIGNOLE on May 25, 1957, but not until civil strife had broken out between rival factions in the Haitian Army. Fignolé himself was exiled by the Haitian Army on June 15 when sharp street fighting broke out in Port-au-Prince between Fignolists and soldiers and after Fignolé had shown signs of wishing to run the Army to suit his own whims. The Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Antonio KEREBAU assumed almost dictatorial power and became President of the Military Council of Government. Much-needed internal tranquility was thus restored by the Army, which ruled under a "state of siege", while civilians and the military alike hoped that elections could soon be held and a duly-elected, constitutional government could be installed.

no mention of Kerebau's slaughter of 2,000 in La Saline & environs?

In the summer of 1957, it became increasingly evident that the three leading contenders for the Haitian Presidency were Dr. François DUVALIER, leader of the emerging black middle-class; Louis DEJOIE, leader of the propertied mulatto elite; and Clement JUMELIE, a former Magloire Cabinet Minister. As the summer wore on it also became obvious that the Haitian Army, which ruled the country, was inclined to favor Duvalier's candidacy and oppose Déjoie's. Despite many accusations that it favored the candidacy of Déjoie, the Embassy's position was one of strict neutrality; its sole wish was to see an early end to the unsatisfactory situation created by the Army's usurpation of power and repressive government.

On August 9, 1957, Brigadier General Antonio Kébreau, President of the Military Council of Government, in an informal conversation with Embassy officers, suggested that the United States should send a U. S. Military Advisory Mission to Haiti, composed of U. S. Marine Corps personnel. Although nothing immediately came of this conversation, it marked the first expression among responsible Haitian Government officials of a desire for a Marine Mission to return to Haiti.

On September 22, 1957, after a lively campaign controlled by the Army, François Duvalier was elected President of Haiti by direct popular vote of 680,509, soundly defeating his chief rival Louis Déjoie who received 249,956 votes. Clément Jumelle withdrew from the race at the last moment. Although the Haitian Army unquestionably oversaw the elections and was in a position virtually to guarantee the victory of its candidate, the fact remains that in the first ostensibly free and constitutional election for President in Haiti's history, Duvalier, the most popular man in the country, was actually elected President and probably would have won a free election even without the support of the Army. Before Duvalier could take office on October 22, however, an event occurred which was to have an unfortunate effect upon Haitian-American relations.

On September 29, 1957, Shibley Jean TALAMAS, an American citizen born in Haiti of naturalized American parents, was beaten to death by Haitian police, who accused him of complicity in a political crime, after Talamas had voluntarily surrendered himself to the police and after Embassy officers had been assured he would not be mistreated. Although the Haitian Government claimed Talamas had died of a heart attack while under interrogation, an examination of Talamas' body by American physicians disclosed that he died from a severe beating and his heart was normal.

On October 12, under instructions from the Department of State, the American Ambassador delivered a note to the Haitian Government asking for an investigation of the Talamas case. The note also rejected the Haitian contention that Talamas' behavior was in defiance of Haitian law. The Ambassador asked to be informed of the date an official inquiry would be undertaken preliminary to trial and punishment of the guilty parties and requested assurances for the protection of American persons and property in Haiti. On October 19 the Ambassador met with President-Elect Duvalier for a discussion of the whole field of Haitian-American relations, including the Talamas case. Duvalier did not comment upon the importance the Ambassador attached to a solution of the case, but did instruct his Foreign Minister to be to meet with the Ambassador and discuss a solution. Three days later Duvalier was inaugurated as President of Haiti; his peaceful accession to power was generally greeted with hope by Haitians of all political opinions who longed for a respite to Haiti's economic and political chaos.

During the last week in October the Ambassador had two inconclusive conversations with the Foreign Minister about the Talamas case, but on November 5 when the two met again the Foreign Minister reiterated the Haitian contentions that Talamas had been deeply involved in politics and that his death was "involuntary homicide" following a struggle with his police interrogators. The next day President Duvalier indicated to the Ambassador that he should deal with the Finance Minister, M. Fritz St. Firmin THEBAUD, for a solution to the Talamas

case, and the Foreign Minister declared that an answer to the Embassy's note delivered October 12 would be sent to the Embassy in a few days. On November 8 the Ambassador provided the Finance Minister with a full explanation of the true facts of the case, which appeared to impress him. Nonetheless, on November 16 the Embassy received a note from the Haitian Government rejecting the United States contention that Talamas had shown respect for Haitian laws and raising the question of whether Talamas was a United States or a Haitian citizen. The note did, however, give assurances that the lives of Americans in Haiti would be respected. On November 20 another note stated that Haitian investigation of the case was in process and that if Army personnel were found guilty, they would be punished. Receipt of these notes was acknowledged by the Embassy, which rejected as unsubstantiated and irrelevant the Haitian charges that Talamas had mixed into Haitian politics.

On November 27 the Ambassador again discussed the Talamas case with President Duvalier, who stated he had taken personal charge of the matter and that the guilty parties would be punished under the Haitian Military Code. Despite this sign that some progress was being made toward a solution of the case, in early December a series of meetings between the Ambassador, the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs in the Department of State, the President and other high Haitian officials proved disappointing. The President showed the United States officials a draft of a proposed note to the American Embassy which was a resume of all the previous irrelevant and specious Haitian arguments. The only new element contained in the note was a half-hearted expression of regret. On December 17 a draft of the proposed Haitian note was submitted informally to the American Ambassador, together with the report of the Haitian Military Board of Inquiry and the report of the court martial of the two officers found responsible for the beating. These documents were disappointing to the Embassy in view of President Duvalier's repeated assurances that he was handling the case personally and would see to it that a mutually acceptable solution were found. By this time it was obvious that the Haitian Army was blocking a prompt settlement of the case. It was further confused and delayed by the action of the Haitian Government in hiring an American lawyer to "advise" it in the matter.

On December 29 the American Ambassador went to Washington to consult on the Talamas case. While the Ambassador was in Washington Mrs. Manise Allen, an American negro, together with her husband, was physically assaulted in downtown Port-au-Prince by a group of Haitian soldiers, taken into custody, verbally abused, and released. On January 5, 1958, under instructions from the Department of State, the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim delivered a note to the Haitian Government expressing the concern of the United States Government over the incident, particularly in view of the recent formal Haitian assurances that the lives and property of foreigners in Haiti would be protected. On January 10 the Embassy received a note from the Haitian Government rejecting the Embassy's charges that the Port-au-Prince police had behaved improperly but repeating assurances that the lives and property of Americans would be protected.

After the Ambassador's return, on January 14, he gave President Duvalier a letter containing a detailed explanation of why the United States Government could not accept the proposed Haitian note, report of the Military Board of

Inquiry and report of the court martial of the Haitian officers implicated in the death of Talamas. The President offered the Ambassador a press release to the effect that the Haitian Government acceded to most of the United States demands concerning a court martial of the guilty Army officers, an indemnity to the Talamas family and an apology to the United States Government. The following day the Ambassador again saw the President to inform him of the terms of a communication which would be acceptable as a solution. However, an impasse ensued which the Ambassador attempted to break through a series of exploratory conversations with the Finance Minister.

On February 5 the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim delivered to the Embassy a note which: (1) apologized for Talamas' death, (2) provided for a new and additional punishment of the officers and men previously found guilty of complicity, (3) offered an indemnity to the Talamas family, and (4) renewed the Haitian Government's assurances that American lives and property would be protected. The Embassy at once replied by note that (1) the Haitian amendments were acceptable, (2) the United States would be interested in receiving further information concerning others who also might have been complicated in the Talamas death, and (3) that the United States welcomed the opportunity to renew the traditional friendship existing between the United States and Haiti. The Talamas case was thereby settled.

Although opponents of the Duvalier Government for political reasons disapproved of the settlement and were displeased at President Duvalier's misleading statements linking the Talamas settlement to the promise of substantial United States monetary assistance, most educated Haitians and Americans resident in Haiti approved of the manner in which the Talamas case was concluded.

The next significant development in Haitian-American relations was the six-day visit to Haiti commencing on March 11 of General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Sr., USMC (Ret.), Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, and a party of high-ranking American officers on the Board. The group, at the express invitation of Chief of Staff Kébreau, came to Haiti to make a first-hand preliminary survey of the possibility of establishing a United States Military Mission in Haiti, a move greatly desired by General Kébreau. No decision on the matter was made at the time, however, and immediately afterwards, for internal political reasons, President Duvalier relieved General Kébreau from his post as Army Chief of Staff and replaced him with Brigadier General Maurice FLAMBERT. That the Haitian Government still desired a United States Military Mission in Haiti was evidenced when a three-man Haitian Army delegation visited Washington in early April formally to request the establishment of such a mission. Washington was also visited in April by a high level Haitian economic and financial mission seeking United States aid to Haiti. The fact that the visits of both of these delegations were inconclusive was overshadowed by the eruption of a period of political disorder and violence in Port-au-Prince in early May, in the course of which the Embassy Residence was sprayed by a fusillade of rifle shots, apparently fired at random by police during a blackout. Playing a prominent role in the outbreak of violence was President Duvalier's terroristic Secret Police, which had been established early in 1958. Nonetheless, by the end of

May the situation had quieted, although not before two American tourists visiting Haiti had been unjustly jailed for failure to observe Haitian immigration laws.

As a result of the Haitian Army delegation's visit to Washington in April, an eight-man United States Marine Corps Survey Team, headed by Major General James P. RISELEY, USMC, arrived in Haiti on May 18 to study at first-hand for two weeks the operations of the Haitian Army and the feasibility of establishing a permanent Military Mission in Haiti composed of United States Marine Corps personnel. Although the Survey Team's subsequent report was generally favorable to the proposal, no decision was taken on it for the time being.

While a decision on what had come to be regarded as a possible United States Marine Corps Mission to Haiti was under consideration in Washington, on July 29, 1958, a group of eight men, five of them American citizens, unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Haitian Government after having sailed to Haiti from Florida in a small U. S. yacht. Although the filibusters managed to seize the principal Haitian Army barracks next door to the National Palace, they were overpowered and killed. The Embassy at once delivered a note to the Haitian Government expressing the United States Government's regrets over the abortive coup and deploring the involvement of American citizens. The Haitian Legislature granted the President emergency powers to rule by decree for six months, and the Haitian Government, fearing further disturbances, reacted with extraordinary defensive precautions. On July 31 a crowd demonstrated peacefully before the American Embassy to protest against the United States for having allowed various opposition leaders to reside and plot on American soil. On August 1 President Duvalier made an inaccurate and misleading statement to the press attempting to focus public resentment over the attempted coup upon the fact that Americans were involved and intimating that the United States was willingly sheltering enemies of his Government. Although the Haitian Government the same day indicated it would grant permission for the Embassy to recover the bodies of the five Americans killed in the coup, it at once began a campaign of evasion, harassment and delay in allowing American consular officials to take custody of the bodies, while at the same time requesting that United States military forces establish an air patrol of the Haitian coast. On August 4 the Embassy received a note from the Haitian Government promising the Embassy the five bodies, but it was not until August 21 that the Embassy actually received custody of the bodies, after a prolonged wrangle with the Haitian authorities over technicalities and formalities imposed by them.

The continuing nervousness of the Haitian Government was made plain when on August 23 President Duvalier requested the American Ambassador to relay to Washington his desire for a sea patrol off the coast of Haiti to impede the threat of new invasion attempts against Haiti. The very next day, in a remote area in the Department of the Northwest, a uniformed United States Army officer attached to the Inter-American Geodetic Survey was seized by a group of peasants, bound and detained after he had landed his U.S. Army helicopter on official business. On August 25 the officer in question, together with the Embassy's Army Attaché, received an apology from Army Chief of Staff Flamberg, while on August 26 the American Ambassador handed the Foreign Minister an informal letter protesting the incident, requesting appropriate disciplinary action against the

guilty parties, and asking that requisite measures be taken to prevent a repetition of any such occurrences in the future. Just prior to this incident, on August 21, at President Duvalier's invitation, the Ambassador met with him and the Foreign Minister for an exceptionally friendly interview to discuss the wording of a joint communique to be widely publicized emphasizing the current friendly relations existing between Haiti and the United States. The communique, released the next day, affirmed President Duvalier's earlier statement that Haitian-American relations in no way had been injured by the July 29 coup and that relations between the two Governments had never been closer. Issuance of this communique was particularly welcome in view of the declaration which had been made on July 28 in New York by the Haitian Minister Without Portfolio that the American Ambassador was to be declared persona non grata for alleged intervention in Haitian internal affairs. This dispelling of any misunderstanding between the United States and Haitian Governments was followed on August 26 by the signing of an agreement whereby the United States Government would send certain surplus foodstuffs to Haiti for distribution to needy persons through local church and welfare organizations.

Despite this climate of goodwill between the two Governments, at the end of August two long-time American residents of Haiti were expelled from Haiti; and two American pilots of a private aircraft were seized and held incommunicado before being released and allowed to proceed on their way.

On September 3, once more due to the failure of the Haitian Government to pay its share of the expenses of the Joint United States-Haitian Point IV servicios, the agriculture and educational servicios were forced temporarily to suspend operations, while on September 9 the field operations of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey were halted in Haiti owing to the Haitian Government's fear of a possible invasion.

Following up the May visit of the Marine Corps Survey Team, on September 10 the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs and a high-ranking Marine Corps officer visited Haiti to discuss the establishment of a Marine Corps Mission to Haiti. After several days of conversations with Haitian Government officials a joint press communique was issued stating that a "preliminary understanding has been reached to conduct negotiations on mutually satisfactory conditions for assignment of United States Marine Corps personnel to Haiti". While this was being decided in Port-au-Prince, in Washington two high Haitian officials were discussing with Export-Import Bank and Development Loan Fund officials the power and irrigation situation of the Artibonite Valley Development Authority (ODVA), in which the United States Government was keenly interested. As a gesture of goodwill, in early October the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier "Franklin D. Roosevelt" with over 3,000 officers and men aboard, visited Port-au-Prince and was enthusiastically welcomed. Hundreds of Haitians flocked aboard and President Duvalier was tendered a luncheon by the ship's commanding officer, while local merchants were well satisfied to have their business establishments filled with free-spending American bluejackets. A few days later the Haitian press hailed the announcement on October 18 that the United States had agreed to dispatch to Haiti a temporary Marine Corps Training Unit. On October 30 the ten-man unit arrived for a month's intensive training

of a picked group of Haitian soldiers.

At the conclusion of the training period, a four-member U. S. Marine Corps Training Command Group visited Haiti to observe a formal guard mount ceremony held to demonstrate the proficiency of the Haitian troops trained by the Training Unit. Both the Training Unit and the Training Command Group were received with cordiality by the Haitian Government, which decorated several of the Marine officers. The Haitian Government indicated its complete satisfaction with the work of the Training Unit and reiterated its hopes for the early arrival of a permanent Marine Mission.

While the final details concerning the establishment of the Marine Mission were being worked out between the United States and Haitian Governments, on December 7, in a surprise move, President Duvalier removed from office Army Chief of Staff Flambert, his deputy, General Roumain, and a number of other officers, including all the eleven full colonels in the Haitian Army, replacing Flambert with Brigadier General Pierre MERCERON and promoting a number of junior officers to the top posts in the Haitian Armed Forces. At the time it was feared that the negotiations concerning the Marine Mission might be affected by the sudden radical alteration in the leadership of the Haitian Army, but it subsequently appeared that although the younger Army officers did entertain certain misgivings toward a U. S. military mission in Haiti, once in their new positions of responsibility they quickly realized the obvious benefits to accrue to the Haitian Government as a whole and the Army in particular through the presence of a Marine Mission to train and advise the Armed Forces of Haiti.

Nonetheless, the continuing instability prevailing in Haiti was made evident on December 8 when an American yacht was fired upon without provocation in the harbor of Jacmel without, however, any injuries resulting from this action.

While negotiations for the Marine Mission were drawing to a close, the Haitian Government was arranging for the United States firm of Klein & Saks, Inc. to give general economic and financial advice at a substantial annual fee. At the time President Duvalier emphasized that he perceived no conflict between the proposed functions of Klein & Saks and those of the International Monetary Fund, International Bank and United States technical assistance advisers. On December 12, 1958, the Haitian Government signed two contracts with Klein & Saks and with Lehman Brothers of New York for the "operation of development banks; agricultural and industrial extension; technical advice to the Haitian Government concerning negotiations with present and future lenders and capitalists; public administration; and a program for taxation and other revenues". The Haitian Government at the time entertained high hopes that through Klein & Saks and Lehman Brothers economic and financial reforms could be effected and new capital brought into the country. Initially all went well and a number of United States experts employed by Klein & Saks came to Haiti to advise the Haitian Government. But the latter had paid the two firms only half their respective annual fees with the understanding that if after six months their work proved satisfactory, they would receive their fees for six months more work. Unfortunately, at the expiration of the first six months of the two firms' contracts the Haitian Government was unwilling to continue their services,

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and most of the Klein & Saks personnel withdrew from Haiti, leaving only a token staff to remain in Haiti until the expiration of the two one-year contracts.

While conversations at the working level were in progress between Embassy officers and representatives of the Haitian Foreign Office and Army regarding an agreement for the permanent Marine Corps Mission to Haiti, on December 11 the Haitian Government requested the recall of the United States Army Attaché in Haiti on the grounds he had behaved in a "suspicious" manner. The Embassy formally rejected as baseless any allegations of improper conduct on the part of the Army Attaché, convinced that his behavior at all times had been above reproach. Nevertheless, the Attaché had to leave Haiti at once. Shortly afterwards the Haitian Government informed the American Ambassador of its desire to sign as soon as possible the agreement for a permanent Marine Mission to Haiti and its willingness to drop a number of its suggested changes in the text of the proposed agreement. Accordingly, on December 24 the American Ambassador and the Haitian Foreign Minister signed an agreement for a greatly expanded United States Naval Mission to Haiti, to be composed primarily of United States Marine Corps officers and men, and established for the purpose of advising, training and increasing the efficiency of the Haitian Army and Coast Guard. The Marine members of the Mission actually commenced to arrive in Haiti in January 1959. The year 1958 thus ended auspiciously for Haitian-American relations.

In mid-January, in view of the very serious financial and economic crisis confronting the Haitian Government (due in large part to its failure to adjust its expenditures to lower receipts from coffee exports, occasioned by a poor crop and its low world price), President Duvalier sent a personal letter to President Eisenhower requesting United States financial aid in the form of short-term balance of payments help, and assistance in financing various long-term economic projects. It also became apparent that Haitian Government expenditures could not be further reduced and that unless Haiti could receive substantial economic assistance, the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti might not be able to maintain convertibility of the gourde. On January 19 an agreement was signed whereby the International Cooperation Administration made available to the Haitian Government up to \$2,000,000 to ensure the stability of the gourde, with Haiti putting up a like sum in gourdes to be used for economic development projects approved by the United States and by Haiti. Haiti's economic and financial position continued to deteriorate, and it became necessary, by an agreement signed February 24, for the International Cooperation Administration to grant Haiti up to \$6,000,000 in financial assistance to meet its balance of payments and internal budgetary deficits during the period February 1 - September 30, 1959. The agreement, the fruit of weeks of negotiation, also provided for a detailed monthly review of Haitian revenues and expenditures as well as for additional administrative advice from the United States Government.

Announcement of the \$6,000,000 grant was made in Haiti by President Duvalier in the course of a triumphant visit on March 6 to Cape Haitien, accompanied by his cabinet, a large number of other high officials, the American Ambassador and other United States Government officials. The President took this occasion

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to express his hope that the United States would extend additional economic and financial assistance to Haiti. The President's tour of the North of Haiti saw commence, in fact, a period of even closer relations and better understanding than had existed before between the United States and the Duvalier Government. Occurring simultaneously with the President's northern tour was a visit to Haiti by United States Negro tennis star Althea Gibson, who was enthusiastically received and whose presence in Haiti served to stimulate Haitian-American friendship.

The genuine wish of the United States to help the Haitian people was publicly demonstrated when the United States Government in April moved to help the starving population of the poverty and drought-stricken Department of the Northwest. By providing 3,000 tons of United States surplus foodstuffs over and above the normal distribution in Haiti of Public Law 480, Title 3, food through local religious and charitable organizations. United States Government officials in Haiti also acted as a focal point for galvanizing local efforts to alleviate the suffering in the drought area. The Department of State had already announced on April 2 that the Development Loan Fund was authorizing a loan of \$4,300,000 to the Haitian Government to complete the 80,000 acre irrigation project in the Artibonite Valley. This decision was supplemented on May 29 with a United States-Haitian technical cooperation agreement.

Haiti and the United States drew still closer when President Duvalier suffered a heart attack on May 25, 1959. The American Embassy at once offered to provide whatever assistance lay within its power, and the offer was gratefully accepted by the Haitian Government, which asked that a heart specialist be dispatched to treat the President. Two United States Navy physicians were flown into Port-au-Prince from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and one of them remained in constant attendance on the President until he began to recover. The Haitian Government also sincerely appreciated the American Ambassador's gesture of friendship and support in visiting President Duvalier in his sickroom on June 2 and subsequently issuing a public statement to the effect that the President was "in good spirits". On June 14 President Duvalier, in a radio message thanking the Haitian people and Army for support during his illness, singled out the American Ambassador for special praise for having given "one more proof of the great friendship which unites the two sister republics". On July 6 President Duvalier formally resumed the duties of his office.

The Haitian Government again turned to the United States for support on July 8, when it officially requested United States help in preserving its neutrality and territorial inviolability as a result of reports that Haiti was about to be invaded from either Cuba or the Dominican Republic. The Haitian Government also offered to make its sea and airports available to the United States Armed Forces so that they could patrol Haitian waters and air space in view of Haiti's own lack of the resources with which adequately to protect itself from invasion. The Haitian Government was advised by the United States Government that it was most sympathetic to the plight of Haiti and would do everything possible in response to its request. United States Navy vessels were dispatched from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to visit Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitian, and Haiti granted blanket permission for United States warships and

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military aircraft to visit Haitian ports and airports. The Haitian Government expressed its pleasure and satisfaction with the measures taken by the United States to help protect Haiti, and rejected offers of military assistance from the Dominican Republic, in line with its avowed policy of strict neutrality. The Haitian Government in addition followed up previous offers, both written and verbal, to allow the United States to establish missile and naval bases in Haiti, as well as to make available to the American Government such areas as might be required for submarine bases and training camps for the purpose of collaborating in the defense efforts of the United States. Although all these offers were being carefully considered by the United States Government, by the end of July the threat of an outbreak of violence in the Caribbean seemed to have subsided, and the Haitian Government was becoming increasingly confident that Haiti and the Duvalier Government, backed by the promise of United States assistance, would survive the threat of possible invasion from without and political and economic instability within.

Thus Haitian-American relations, subject to many stresses and strains during the two years following July 1957, at the end of July 1959 could fairly be described as close and harmonious, with both nations striving toward the common goals of improvement of the lot of the Haitian people and the preservation of the peace and stability of the Caribbean area.

VPRandolphIII:eh
August 7, 1959

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